CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (2024)

Welcome to the weekly highlights and analysis of theblueteamsecsubreddit (and my wider reading). Not everything makes it in, but the best bits do.

Operationally this week it has once again been around edge network devices proving to be of interest.

In the high-level this week:

Reflection this week is around the response to the Cisco ASA issue. Having been on the inside and seeing industry and Governments work together is a thing of wonder. This is truly our super power against our adversaries…

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All attribution is by others and not the UK Government unless specifically stated as such, please see the legal text at the end.

Have a lovely Friday..

Ollie

Who is doing what to whom and how allegedly.

Analyzing Forest Blizzard’s custom post-compromise tool for exploiting CVE-2022-38028 to obtain credentials

Microsoft provides insight into to post compromise tradecraft by this alleged Russian threat actor.

Since at least June 2020 and possibly as early as April 2019, Forest Blizzard has used the tool, which we refer to as GooseEgg, to exploit the CVE-2022-38028 vulnerability in Windows Print Spooler service by modifying a JavaScript constraints file and executing it with SYSTEM-level permissions. Microsoft has observed Forest Blizzard using GooseEgg as part of post-compromise activities against targets including Ukrainian, Western European, and North American government, non-governmental, education, and transportation sector organizations. While a simple launcher application, GooseEgg is capable of spawning other applications specified at the command line with elevated permissions, allowing threat actors to support any follow-on objectives such as remote code execution, installing a backdoor, and moving laterally through compromised networks.

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/04/22/analyzing-forest-blizzards-custom-post-compromise-tool-for-exploiting-cve-2022-38028-to-obtain-credentials/

UAC-0133 (Sandworm) plans for cyber sabotage on almost 20 objects of critical infrastructure of Ukraine

Ukraine’s CERT alleged that Russia was going after industrial control systems in ten (yes you read that right) regions of Ukraine. The scale of the ICS focused operation will be of note.

In March 2024, the government computer emergency response team of Ukraine CERT-UA revealed a malicious plan of the Sandworm group, aimed at disrupting the stable functioning of the information and communication systems (ICS) of about twenty enterprises in the energy, water and heat supply industry (OKI) in ten regions of Ukraine.

In addition to the QUEUESEED (KNUCKLETOUCH, ICYWELL, WRONGSENS, KAPEKA) backdoor known since 2022, a new toolkit of attackers, namely the LOADGRIP and BIASBOAT (Linux variant of QUEUESEED) malware, was discovered during the immediate incident response. on a computer (Linux OS) designed for the automation of processes of technological process management (ASUTP) using specialized software (SPZ) of domestic production. It should be noted that BIASBOAT was presented as a file encrypted for a specific server, for which the attackers used the previously obtained "machine-id" value.

https://cert.gov.ua/article/6278706

Unpacking the Blackjack Group's f*cknet Malware

Team82 detail an interesting campaign which is notable for its scale, the type of technology being targeted and the country within which it happened (Russia).

Blackjack said that the JSON files it made public were only a sample of the full extent of their activity, and that the attack was carried out against 2,659 sensor-gateways, about 1,700 of which were “reachable and successfully attacked.”

The group also said it never claimed to have destroyed 87,000 sensors, rather disabled them by destroying the gateways and fuzzing the sensors using a dedicated M-Bus fuzzer within the malware’s code.

Blackjack claims its initial compromise of Moscollector began in June 2023, and since then the group said it has worked slowly in an attempt to cripple the industrial sensors and monitoring infrastructure managed by the company. On Tuesday, the hackers publicly released information about their activities against Moscollector and the information stolen in the attack on the ruexfil website. Some of their claims include:

  • Gaining access to Russia’s 112 emergency service number.

  • Hacking and bricking sensors and controllers in critical infrastructure (including airports, subways, gas-pipelines), all of which have been disabled.

  • Sharing details about and code from the f*cknet malware used in the attack

  • Disabling network appliances such as routers and firewalls

  • Deleting servers, workstations and databases; 30 TB of data has been wiped, including backup drives.

  • Disabling access to the Moscollector office building (all keycards have been invalidated).

  • Dumping passwords from multiple internal services

https://claroty.com/team82/research/unpacking-the-blackjack-groups-f*cknet-malware

Reporting on China

Unplugging PlugX: Sinkholing the PlugX USB worm botnet

Felix Aimé and Charles M show both how relatively easily it is to take control of some latent compromises. Second is the scale of this alleged Chinese campaign - doesn’t feel proportionate.

  • In September 2023, we successfully sinkholed a command and control server linked to the PlugX worms. For just $7, we acquired the unique IP address tied to a variant of this worm, which had been previously documented by Sophos.

  • Almost four years after its initial launch, between ~90,000 to ~100,000 unique public IP addresses are still infected, sending distinctive PlugX requests daily to our sinkhole. We observed in 6 months of sinkholing more than 2,5M unique IPs connecting to it.

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (1)

https://blog.sekoia.io/unplugging-plugx-sinkholing-the-plugx-usb-worm-botnet/

Note: these is also a video of this talk - you can see it here.

ToddyCat is making holes in your infrastructure

Andrey Gunkin, Alexander Fedotov and Natalya Shornikova provide some insight into alleged Chinese state aligned post compromise activity on Windows hosts. They used at least four different tunneling tools to maintain their footholds within networks - this is noteworthy.

During the observation period, we noted that this group stole data on an industrial scale. To collect large volumes of data from many hosts, attackers need to automate the data harvesting process as much as possible, and provide several alternative means to continuously access and monitor systems they attack. We decided to investigate how this was implemented by ToddyCat. Note that all tools described in this article are applied at the stage where the attackers have compromised high-privileged user credentials allowing them to connect to remote hosts. In most cases, the adversary connected, transferred and run all required tools with the help of PsExec or Impacket.

https://securelist.com/toddycat-traffic-tunneling-data-extraction-tools/112443/

China's Military Cyber Operations

Pukhraj Singh provides their summary of alleged Chinese military cyber operations, their structure and similar.

https://onedrive.live.com/?authkey=%21ABj3G%2D0i1vrs0tU&id=98B2960CF35DF27B%2187639&cid=98B2960CF35DF27B&parId=root&parQt=sharedby&o=OneUp

i-SOON Toolkit: What is “TZ”?

Natto Thoughts doing what they do best (i.e. analysis). They continue their analysis of the alleged i-Soon leaks.

The Natto Team started by looking into the context when TZ appeared in phrases in the i-SOON leaked documents. Here are TZ phrases we discovered:

  • TZ业务: TZ business

  • TZ实战业务: TZ live combat business

  • TZ 工作: TZ work

  • TZ平台: TZ platform

  • TZ 武器装备: TZ weapon and equipment

To conclude, The Natto Team replaced “TZ” with “reconnaissance” in the following paragraphs from the preface section of i-SOON’s Integrated Combat Platform marketing paper that previously mentioned. Does this all make sense now?

nattothoughts.substack.com/p/i-soon-toolkit-what-is-tz?triedRedirect=true

From BYOVD to a 0-day: Unveiling Advanced Exploits in Cyber Recruiting Scams

Luigino Camastra shows why no one should underestimate North Korea if this alleged campaign is indeed them. Noteworthy due to the level of technical capability around vulnerability research and exploitation on show.

  • [We] discovered a new campaign targeting specific individuals through fabricated job offers.

  • [We] uncovered a full attack chain from infection vector to deploying “FudModule 2.0” rootkit with 0-day Admin -> Kernel exploit.

  • [We] found a previously undocumented Kaolin RAT, where it could aside from standard RAT functionality, change the last write timestamp of a selected file and load any received DLL binary from C&C server. We also believe it was loading FudModule along with a 0-day exploit.

Our investigation has revealed that the Lazarus group targeted individuals through fabricated job offers and employed a sophisticated toolset to achieve better persistence while bypassing security products. Thanks to our robust telemetry, we were able to uncover almost the entire attack chain, thoroughly analyzing each stage. The Lazarus group’s level of technical sophistication was surprising and their approach to engaging with victims was equally troubling.It is evident that they invested significant resources in developing such a complex attack chain. What is certain is that Lazarus had to innovate continuously and allocate enormous resources to research various aspects of Windows mitigations and security products. Their ability to adapt and evolve poses a significant challenge to cybersecurity efforts.

https://decoded.avast.io/luiginocamastra/from-byovd-to-a-0-day-unveiling-advanced-exploits-in-cyber-recruiting-scams/

Multi-level Dropbox commands and TutorialRAT behind APT43

Genians detail an alleged North Korean campaign which continues to be rather rudimentary in terms of initial access tradecraft.

  • As of the first quarter of 2024, the activity level of APT attacks in Korea remains high, and in the case of spear phishing, 'shortcut (LNK)' type attacks continue, requiring special attention.

  • Luring people by impersonating them as policy meetings, advisory meetings, surveys, lecture guides, etc.

  • Initial approach begins with a normal email and uses a reactive spear phishing strategy.

  • Legitimate use of Dropbox's multi-level attack chain and TutorialRAT attack

  • Confirmed to be an extension of the APT43 group's BabyShark threat campaign

https://www-genians-co-kr.translate.goog/blog/threat_intelligence/dropbox?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Identify North Korea's K-defense company hacking attack

South Korean Police detail various alleged North Korean campaigns. The techniques include compromise of Internet exposed servers as well as malware for initial access. Putting the P in Persistent.

  • North Korean hacking organization Lazarus‧Andariel‧Kim Soo-ki is all targeting defense technology.

  • Defense industry companies, etc. “Change e-mail passwords periodically.”

https://www.police.go.kr/user/bbs/BD_selectBbs.do?q_bbsCode=1002&q_bbscttSn=20240423132830276

Reporting on Iran

MuddyWater campaign abusing Atera Agents

An alleged Iranian operation detailed here by Harfang Lab. Of note is the use of one victim to target another coupled with the specific remote monitoring and management tool in use.

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (2)

We have been closely monitoring the activities of the Iranian state-sponsored threat actor MuddyWater since the beginning of 2024. Our investigations reveal an active campaign that has been ramping up since October 2023, aligning with the Hamas attack that took place that month1. In this latest campaign, MuddyWater has been heavily relying on a legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool called Atera Agent.

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (3)

https://harfanglab.io/en/insidethelab/muddywater-rmm-campaign/

ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices

Cisco have detailed this campaign which is noteworthy due to the level of sophistication even if unattributed.

Cisco was initially alerted to suspicious activity on an ASA device in early 2024. The investigation that followed identified additional victims, all of which involved government networks globally. During the investigation, we identified actor-controlled infrastructure dating back to early November 2023, with most activity taking place between December 2023 and early January 2024. Further, we have identified evidence that suggests this capability was being tested and developed as early as July 2023.

https://blog.talosintelligence.com/arcanedoor-new-espionage-focused-campaign-found-targeting-perimeter-network-devices/

We at the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre also released a number of related notes:
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-partners-advice-mitigate-cisco-firewall-targeting

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/exploitation-vulnerabilities-affecting-cisco-firewall-platforms

These included two bits of malware analysis.
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/line/ncsc-tip-line-dancer.pdf

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/line/ncsc-tip-line-runner.pdf

LightSpy Malware Variant Targeting macOS

Stuart Ashenbrenner and Alden Schmidt evidence the increased sophistication against macOS by this unattributed threat actor. Also of note if how the macOS version has more operational security than the iOS version.

It’s also important to note that while we were able to find the Android version of this malware on the same C2 as the macOS version, it doesn't appear the iOS version is also present. In this article, we'll only be focusing on the macOS implant.

Generally, the macOS version seems to be more refined than the iOS version. The operational security (opsec) is significantly improved, the development practices seem more mature, and things are generally more organized.

https://www.huntress.com/blog/lightspy-malware-variant-targeting-macos

DuneQuixote campaign targets Middle Eastern entities with “CR4T” malware

Kaspersky provide reporting on this unattributed campaign. Shows a degree of op-sec savviness.

In February 2024, we discovered a new malware campaign targeting government entities in the Middle East. We dubbed it “DuneQuixote”; and our investigation uncovered over 30 DuneQuixote dropper samples actively employed in the campaign.

The group behind the campaign took steps to prevent collection and analysis of its implants and implemented practical and well-designed evasion methods both in network communications and in the malware code.

..

We discovered victims in the Middle East, as per our telemetry, as early as February 2023. Additionally, there were several uploads to a semi-public malware scanning service at a later stage, more specifically starting on December 12 2023, with more than 30 submissions of the droppers in the period up to the end of January 2024. The majority of these uploads also originated from the Middle East. Other sources we suspect to be VPN exit nodes geo-located in South Korea, Luxembourg, Japan, Canada, Netherlands and the US.

https://securelist.com/dunequixote/112425/

Malvertising campaign targeting IT teams with MadMxShell

Roy Tay details a campaign which is interesting due to who is being targeted.

Beginning in March of 2024, [we] observed a threat actor weaponizing a cluster of domains masquerading as legitimate IP scanner software sites to distribute a previously unseen backdoor. The threat actor registered multiple look-alike domains using a typosquatting technique and leveraged Google Ads to push these domains to the top of search engine results targeting specific search keywords, thereby luring victims to visit these sites.

https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/malvertising-campaign-targeting-it-teams-madmxshell

Threat Group FIN7 Targets the U.S. Automotive Industry

BlackBerry detail a campaign which is noteworthy due to the sector being targeted and as with the MaxMxShell campaign who in the organisations were being targeted. Not sure that IT teams in all cases understand they are deeply interesting to adversaries.

n late 2023, [our] analysts identified a spear-phishing campaign by threat group FIN7 that targeted a large automotive manufacturer based in the United States. FIN7 identified employees at the company who worked in the IT department and had higher levels of administrative rights. They used the lure of a free IP scanning tool to run their well-known Anunak backdoor and gain an initial foothold utilizing living off the land binaries, scripts, and libraries (lolbas).

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (4)

https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/04/fin7-targets-the-united-states-automotive-industry

How we find and understand the latent compromises within our environments.

Blauhaunt: A tool collection for filtering and visualizing logon events

A tool which will materially help teams undertaking hunting.

Designed to help answering the "Cotton Eye Joe" question (Where did you come from where did you go) in Security Incidents and Threat Hunts

https://github.com/cgosec/Blauhaunt

Shining Light into the Tunnel: Understanding and Classifying Network Traffic of Residential Proxies

Ronghong Huang, Dongfang Zhao, Xianghang Mi and Xiaofeng Wang attempt to detect residential proxies with this work.

Emerging in recent years, residential proxies (RESIPs) feature multiple unique characteristics when compared with traditional network proxies (e.g., commercial VPNs), particularly, the deployment in residential networks rather than data center networks, the worldwide distribution in tens of thousands of cities and ISPs, and the large scale of millions of exit nodes. All these factors allow RESIP users to effectively masquerade their traffic flows as ones from authentic residential users, which leads to the increasing adoption of RESIP services, especially in malicious online activities.

https://chasesecurity.github.io/bandwidth_sharing/

Zawadi Done and Borys Avdieiev provide some practical detection techniques for this implant framework.

Finally, we discussed the network protocols Sliver supports to communicate with targeted systems, the use of which can be detected by fingerprinting the TLS configurations of C2 servers. We explored other methods of detecting abnormal network traffic initiated by Sliver and finished with a discussion about the various detection possibilities.

https://www.huntandhackett.com/blog/hunting-for-a-sliver

​​Investigating Industrial Control Systems using ICSpector open-source framework

Maayan Shaul provides a walk through on real-world ICS hunting with this framework. Something the world needs to get more practised at.

ICSpector, an open-source framework that facilitates the examination of the information and configurations of industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs). This framework simplifies the process of locating PLCs and detecting any anomalous indicators that are compromised or manipulated. This can assist you in safeguarding the PLCs from adversaries who intend to harm or disrupt their operations.

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/investigating-industrial-control-systems-using-microsoft-s/ba-p/4120580

How we proactively defend our environments.

Updated April, 2024 by the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/governance-and-user-education/incident-response/cyber-security-incident-response-planning-practitioner-guidance

KB5025885: How to manage the Windows Boot Manager revocations for Secure Boot changes associated with CVE-2023-24932

Gary Blok shows how tricky some things are to patch, especially when they involve cryptographic keys.

Once you’ve applied the mitigations outlined in the KB, the device is difficult to work with when it comes to boot media / reimaging. Personally, I’d only do this on some lab test machines, and not rollout to larger groups until MS provides a better story for managing post mitigated machines. My assumption is that this will be a horror story until October when 24H2 is released.

https://garytown.com/powershell-script-kb5025885-how-to-manage-the-windows-boot-manager-revocations-for-secure-boot-changes-associated-with-cve-2023-24932

related Microsoft also released the new phase in Revoking vulnerable Windows boot managers

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/revoking-vulnerable-windows-boot-managers/ba-p/4121735

Microsoft provides some learnings from the field

This set of guides not only boosts analytical capabilities but also contextualizes the evidence within the security frameworks developed by Microsoft over years of incident response

https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft-brand/documents/IR-Guidebook-Final.pdf

How they got in and what they did.

MITRE Response to Cyber Attack in One of Its R&D Networks

MITRE shows incidents can and do happen to anyone.

MITRE today disclosed that despite its fervent commitment to safeguarding its digital assets, it experienced a breach that underscores the nature of modern cyber threats. After detecting suspicious activity on its Networked Experimentation, Research, and Virtualization Environment (NERVE), a collaborative network used for research, development, and prototyping, compromise by a foreign nation-state threat actor was confirmed.

https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/news-release/mitre-response-cyber-attack-one-its-rd-networks

https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/advanced-cyber-threats-impact-even-the-most-prepared-56444e980dc8

Our attack surface.

Chinese research into Electron based application attack techniques. Also shows the long list of vulnerabilities which have stemmed from it.

https://mp-weixin-qq-com.translate.goog/s/xEvkvvfA89xeHFKQUqRmEw?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Attack capability, techniques and trade-craft.

Sniping at web applications to discover input-handling vulnerabilities

The Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques was a new one on me.

Ciro Brandi, Gaetano Perrone and Simon Pietro Romano provide this paper which shows there is still value in combining fuzzing techniques.

However, existing literature has often underemphasized the nuances of web-centric fuzzing methodologies. This article presents a comprehensive exploration of fuzzing techniques specifically tailored to web applications, addressing the gap in the current research. Our work presents a holistic perspective on web-centric fuzzing, introduces a modular architecture that improves fuzzing effectiveness, demonstrates the reusability of certain fuzzing steps, and offers an open-source software package for the broader security community.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11416-024-00518-0

Or Yair shows compatibility layers continue to be a gift that keeps on creating vulnerability..

When a user executes a function that has a path argument in Windows, the DOS path at which the file or folder exists is converted to an NT path. During this conversion process, a known issue exists in which the function removes trailing dots from any path element and any trailing spaces from the last path element. This action is completed by most user-space APIs in Windows. By exploiting this known issue, I was able to uncover:

  • One remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2023-36396) in Windows’s new extraction logic for all newly supported archive types that allowed me to craft a malicious archive that would write anywhere I chose on a remote computer once extracted, leading to code execution.

  • Two elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerabilities: one (CVE-2023-32054) that allowed me to write into files without the required privileges by manipulating the restoration process of a previous version from a shadow copy and another that allowed me to delete files without the required privileges.

https://www.safebreach.com/blog/magicdot-a-hackers-magic-show-of-disappearing-dots-and-spaces/

What is being exploited.

More on the PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400

Chandan B.N. leads by example of what all vendors should be doing when their products exhibit vulnerability. Also provides a write-up of what happened around this specific one.

Per our standard product security assurance process, we are performing a Root Cause Analysis to further identify these issues, ensure that they are identified and addressed during development, and continue to enhance product design, including resistance to such attacks.

https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2024/04/more-on-the-pan-os-cve/

CrushFTP v11 versions below 11.1 have a vulnerability where users can escape their VFS and download system files. This has been patched in v11.1.0. Customers using a DMZ in front of their main CrushFTP instance are partially protected with its protocol translation system it utilizes. A DMZ however does not fully protect you and you must update immediately. (CREDIT:Simon Garrelou, of Airbus CERT)

  • Can you tell me how I can check if I have been exploited? Not really..the nature of this was common words that could be in your log already. So there is no silver bullet search term to check for. Looking for "<INCLUDE" is an indicator.

https://www.crushftp.com/crush11wiki/Wiki.jsp?page=Update

https://crushftp.com/version11_build.html

Low level tooling and techniques for attack and defence researchers…

patology: Python script to decrypt Synology .pat files

Expect more vulnerability research for these devices..

https://visit.suspect.network/reversing-adventures/decrypting-synology-patchfiles

https://github.com/sud0woodo/patology

Some other small (and not so small) bits and bobs which might be of interest.

Unless stated otherwise, linked or referenced content does not necessarily represent the views of the NCSC and reference to third parties or content on their websites should not be taken as endorsem*nt of any kind by the NCSC. The NCSC has no control over the content of third party websites and consequently accepts no responsibility for your use of them.

This newsletter is subject to the NCSC website terms and conditions which can be found at https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-this-website/terms-and-conditions and you can find out more about how will treat your personal information in our privacy notice at https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-this-website/privacy-statement.

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CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending April 28th (2024)

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